operations and structure

Both Hudson Valley Foie Gras and La Belle Farm were located in rural Sullivan County, New York, and their operations expanded significantly between the 1990s and 2004. HVFG’s farm is situated on a ~200-acre property in Ferndale, NY, in the Catskill Mountains[20], while La Belle Farm operates on a 40-acre farm in the same county[10]. These farms are vertically integrated “duck ranches,” encompassing breeding or raising of ducklings, force-feeding (gavage) barns, slaughter, and processing on site. Facilities and Expansion: Hudson Valley Foie Gras (HVFG) began by converting an old chicken farm into a modern duck foie gras facility in the early 1990s[6]. Over the next decade, HVFG added new barns and equipment to scale up production. By the 2000s, HVFG was described as a “massive factory farm” by critics[21] – processing hundreds of thousands of ducks annually – but it also portrayed itself as a collection of “cage-free barns” where ducks are sheltered but able to move within group pens[22]. Photographic accounts show that ducks were kept in large warehouse-like barns, in group pens with grated floors (to allow waste to fall through) during the feeding period[23][24]. La Belle Farm, starting later in 1999, likewise built barn infrastructure to raise and force-feed ducks. By learning from HVFG’s methods (and through global research trips[25][26]), La Belle introduced modern feeding equipment and refined processes on its 40 acres. Both farms invested in feed silos, automated pumping systems, waste management systems (manure lagoons or composting), and processing facilities on-site to slaughter and pack ducks. Financing for growth likely came from reinvested profits and possibly private investors or loans; HVFG’s rapid growth and profitability in the ’90s (21% profit margins[1]) suggests it funded expansion internally. There were also government-backed efforts to defend these farms as valuable to the local economy (e.g. a 2004 economic report highlighting foie gras as 43% of Sullivan County’s agricultural output[27]), which implies local authorities were supportive of the farms’ expansion. Flock Size and Breeds: Both HVFG and La Belle raise Moulard ducks, a sterile hybrid of Pekin (white farm duck) and Muscovy duck, which is the standard breed for foie gras production[28]. The Moulard ducks are hatched (in-house or sourced as ducklings) and grown on-site. Flock size at any given time numbers in the tens of thousands. For example, Sonoma Foie Gras in CA had about 20,000 ducks on its farm at a time in 2003[9]; HVFG and LaBelle, being larger, may each have had similar or greater numbers concurrently, cycling through multiple batches per year. By the mid-2000s, HVFG was raising and slaughtering roughly 350,000 ducks per year[13], implying an average inventory in the tens of thousands at any moment (since the force-feeding cycle is ~3 weeks at the end of a duck’s life). La Belle Farm’s production (130k/year by later estimates) suggests it maintained smaller flocks at a time than HVFG, but still on the order of several thousand ducks being force-fed simultaneously. Workforce and Labor Conditions: Running these operations is labor-intensive. By the mid-2000s, Hudson Valley Foie Gras employed about 200 workers[13], many of whom were immigrants. The Saravia family’s La Belle Farm is described as “family-run”, but in practice they too rely on hired labor – in fact, four generations of the Saravia family have been involved, but the farm’s output (182,000 ducks/year as of recent data) requires a substantial workforce[10][18]. Workers handle tasks from feeding and barn cleaning to slaughtering and packing. Conditions for workers at these foie gras farms drew criticism. Many laborers were Latino immigrants (some undocumented), who often lived in on-farm housing. Investigations in the 2000s alleged that around 300 undocumented workers lived in squalid conditions at HVFG, without proper overtime pay or days off[29]. Workers were said to labor long hours performing difficult tasks like catching and force-feeding ducks. In one exposé, the New York Times reported on exploitation and abuse of workers at HVFG, painting a grim picture of “labor camps” on the farm[29]. (HVFG’s management, for its part, touted the jobs created and argued that many workers were happy to have steady employment. Nonetheless, worker treatment became a point of contention and even legal action later on – e.g. lawsuits over unpaid wages in the late 2000s.) Capital Investments: Both farms invested in mechanization of feeding. Originally, foie gras was often produced by hand-feeding using a funnel and tube. By the 1990s, HVFG (with Yanay’s Israeli farming background) introduced pneumatic or mechanical feeders. An 8-10 inch metal tube attached to a hydraulic pump is used to deliver the corn mash into the duck’s esophagus in a few seconds[30]. This equipment, along with climate-controlled barns and on-site processing plants, required significant capital. In terms of financing, no public records explicitly detail loans, but given Sullivan County’s support, it’s possible the farms benefited from agricultural loans or local economic development funds. They certainly reinvested their profits (HVFG’s ~$9M sales by 1999[1]) into growing the business. By 2003, the industry was sizeable enough that producers commissioned an economic impact study (by Shepstone Management) to underscore their contributions[2][16], a document likely used to defend against legislative threats. Environmental Infrastructure: A noteworthy aspect of operations is waste management. Force-feeding ducks produces a large amount of manure and water runoff. Both HVFG and La Belle, situated near waterways in the Catskills, had to contend with environmental regulations. Manure was often collected – La Belle Farm claims it “donates all the farm’s duck manure to local farmers for fertilizer,” presenting this as a sustainable practice[31]. Even so, waste disposal lagoons and treatment systems were needed. HVFG in particular ran into trouble: by 2005–2007 it was sued under the Clean Water Act for polluting a local stream with runoff, eventually resulting in fines and injunctions[32][33]. These legal challenges forced HVFG to invest in better waste containment (e.g. obtaining proper permits, monitoring manure spread, and limiting discharge)[32][34]. While these environmental compliance issues peaked after 2004, it’s likely that even in the late ’90s HVFG had crude systems (lagoon ponds) that were a weak point in operations, later necessitating upgrades. In summary, by 2004 Hudson Valley Foie Gras and La Belle Farm had scaled up to industrial-style operations: multi-building farm complexes with thousands of ducks, a few hundred workers, and integrated systems from feeding to slaughter. They transformed a niche artisanal product into a more standardized agribusiness – albeit one still relatively small compared to mainstream poultry farming. Sullivan County’s historical poultry-farming expertise and available land facilitated this growth[35]. Both farms also emphasized using the “whole duck”: foie gras was the marquee product, but they sold magret (duck breast), confit legs, rendered fat, down feathers, etc., to maximize revenue per bird[2][36]. This diversified product line helped finance their sustainability, cushioning the business against foie gras-only volatility.

Foie gras consumption in the U.S. is concentrated in a handful of urban fine-dining markets. During 2010–2017, the New York City metro area was by far the largest. Other significant markets included Las Vegas, Chicago, parts of California (when legal), Washington D.C., and a few other major cities. Below is an overview and relative ranking of key foie gras markets in this period: New York City: NYC was the foie gras epicenter, often described as the nation’s #1 market for fine dining. In 2019, just after our period, it was reported that approximately 1,000 restaurants in NYC had foie gras on the menu. This figure underscores how common the dish was in New York’s dining scene – from Michelin-starred French restaurants to high-end steakhouses and trendy bistros. During 2010–2017, usage was similarly widespread. Types of venues: virtually every French haute cuisine restaurant served foie gras (e.g. Le Bernardin, Per Se, Daniel, Jean-Georges all featured it in tasting menus or appetizers). Steakhouses and New American restaurants embraced foie gras too – for instance, the famous “DB Burger” at Daniel Boulud’s bistro (a $35 burger stuffed with braised short ribs and foie gras) became emblematic of NYC’s decadent twists. Upscale hotel restaurants, chef-owned farm-to-table spots, and even some modern Japanese omakase bars experimented with foie gras courses. New York’s sheer size and its role as a dining capital meant it likely consumed more foie gras than the rest of the country combined. In fact, the two farms estimated that up to 30% of their total foie gras sales came just from NYC restaurants. This heavy dependence on NYC underscores its top rank. (Notably, the NYC market remained robust through 2017, despite bubbling political opposition.) Las Vegas: With its concentration of high-end eateries on the Strip, Las Vegas was a major foie gras hub, often considered the #2 market. Dozens of Las Vegas restaurants offered foie gras in some form. An Eater Vegas guide in 2017 listed 25 notable restaurants with foie gras dishes, ranging from classic French to inventive fusion spots. Types of venues: primarily casino resort restaurants run by celebrity chefs (e.g. Joël Robuchon at MGM Grand, Restaurant Guy Savoy at Caesars, José Andrés’ Bazaar Meat). These places served foie gras terrines, seared foie appetizers, and whimsical creations (like foie gras candy “lollipops” at André’s, or foie gras brûlée). Steakhouses in Vegas also joined in, adding foie gras add-ons to steaks or featuring it in surf-and-turf extravagances. Given Vegas’s tourist-driven luxury market, foie gras was seen as a must-have indulgence on many tasting menus. While exact numbers are hard to pin down, insiders noted “foie gras is pretty plentiful in Vegas”, cutting across many cuisines. Therefore, Las Vegas firmly held the #2 spot by consumption volume and visibility. Chicago: Chicago was a top foie gras market by the 2010s (likely ranked #3), albeit one with a complex history. The city had briefly banned foie gras from 2006–2008, but after that “repeal,” Chicago chefs enthusiastically put it back on menus. Throughout the 2010–2017 period, dozens of Chicago restaurants served foie gras. Types of venues: Chicago’s fine dining temples (e.g. Alinea, Grace, Tru) incorporated foie gras in elaborate dishes; contemporary American bistros offered seared foie gras or mousse; and even creative concepts emerged – like foie gras “cotton candy” at Chef José Andrés’ Bazaar Meat (which opened in Chicago after success in Vegas) or foie gras crème brûlée at a local wine lounge. Classic French establishments and steakhouses in Chicago also featured foie gras terrines or au torchon preparations. It’s worth noting that Chicago’s chef community was vocal during and after the ban, which perhaps boosted interest – some chefs “ducked” the ban by giving foie gras away as a free “side” to skirt the law, and after 2008 many felt free to celebrate foie gras openly. While the total number of Chicago restaurants with foie gras likely numbered in the tens (not hundreds like NYC), Chicago’s role as the Midwest’s culinary capital made it a significant market. California (Los Angeles & San Francisco Bay Area): California was a volatile market due to the statewide ban that took effect in mid-2012. In the early part of the decade (2010–2011), Los Angeles and San Francisco were large foie gras centers – LA’s numerous fine dining spots (Spago, Mélisse, Providence, etc.) and SF’s upscale restaurants (French Laundry in nearby Yountville, Saison, etc.) all served foie gras. Many Napa Valley establishments and luxury hotels in SoCal (e.g. The Beverly Hills Hotel’s restaurant) offered it as well. However, from July 2012 until January 2015, California law prohibited foie gras sales, sharply curtailing consumption. Some chefs staged “farewell foie gras” dinners before the ban and then complied, while a few rebel chefs (e.g. in the Bay Area) tried underground or “complimentary” foie gras servings to flout the law. In January 2015, a federal judge overturned the ban, ruling foie gras (if produced out-of-state) could be sold in CA[1]. For about 2½ years (2015–2017), California restaurants enthusiastically reintroduced foie gras. Diners in LA and SF suddenly found foie gras back on menus: chefs like Ludo Lefebvre in LA famously resumed offering it. Unfortunately for them, in September 2017 the ban was reinstated by the Ninth Circuit Court[2] (and later upheld). During the legal reprieve, California likely became a substantial market again – Los Angeles chefs, in particular, are known to love foie gras as a marker of fine cuisine, and many had dishes ready to go once legal. For example, the Los Angeles Times in 2015 noted chefs citywide “eagerly putting foie gras back on the plate” after the court ruling. Types of venues: high-end Cal-French and New American restaurants were primary (e.g. Chef Dominique Crenn in SF, Michael Tusk at Quince, etc., all of whom served foie gras when allowed). Additionally, luxury hotel restaurants in LA (like Wolfgang Puck’s CUT steakhouse) and Wine Country restaurants in Napa/Sonoma (when legal) featured foie gras pairings with local wines. In summary, California’s consumption was stop-and-go: high demand when legal, zero when banned. Averaging the decade, California would rank slightly below Chicago and Vegas overall, but permitted periods saw LA and SF surge near the top. Washington, D.C.: The D.C. metro area was a notable market (perhaps top 5 by volume). As the nation’s capital with an affluent dining clientele, D.C. had many fine dining establishments that served foie gras – from French restaurants in Georgetown to high-end New American spots. For instance, restaurants like Minibar by José Andrés, Komi, and steakhouse institutions occasionally included foie gras preparations. Estimates by activist groups in the early 2020s indicated 20–30 restaurants in D.C. had routinely offered foie gras before pressure campaigns. Types of venues: A mix of classic French brasseries, upscale hotels (the Watergate’s Kingbird, etc.), and chef-driven restaurants around D.C. used foie gras as a luxe ingredient. Foie gras torchon or seared slices could be found on tasting menus and as add-ons (e.g. foie gras atop steaks or burgers in power dining spots). Toward 2017, D.C. also saw the beginnings of local activism (the DC Council considered a ballot measure to ban it around 2018, which indicates at least moderate prevalence up to that point). Overall, D.C. was smaller than the above markets but still important – likely consuming on the order of a few hundred pounds of foie gras a week at its peak, given the number of participating restaurants. Miami and South Florida: Miami Beach and the greater South Florida luxury dining scene formed another cluster. High-end hotel restaurants in Miami (e.g. those by Jean-Georges Vongerichten or Thomas Keller’s Per Se pop-up at Surf Club) and trendy fine dining spots catered to international tourists who expected foie gras on menus. The Miami area probably had a dozen or more restaurants featuring foie gras in the 2010s – especially French and “Floribbean” fusion places that liked to incorporate global luxury touches. Additionally, Palm Beach’s old-guard French restaurants and Orlando’s small cadre of chef’s table restaurants (serving convention and theme-park visitors seeking luxury meals) sometimes offered foie gras. Miami wasn’t as significant as NYC or Vegas, but it was a regional hotspot in the Southeast for foie gras consumption. Texas (Houston, Dallas, Austin – the “Texas Triangle”): The major Texas cities each had a handful of restaurants using foie gras, catering to oil executives, business diners, and foodies. For example, Dallas and Houston boast several high-end steakhouses (e.g. Pappas Bros.) and French restaurants (like Dallas’s Lavendou or Le Bilboquet) that have long featured foie gras dishes. Austin, known for its innovative dining, saw chefs incorporate foie gras into modern dishes, and San Antonio’s resorts occasionally did as well. Across Texas, one could find foie gras on gourmet burgers, seared with Texan wagyu beef, or turned into pâté at French-inspired bistros. The Texas Triangle collectively likely accounted for a modest but real share of domestic foie gras sales. If each major city had, say, 5–15 restaurants serving it, Texas as a whole might have had 30–40 establishments using foie gras in the mid-2010s. These markets ranked below the coastal big cities but were notable for spreading foie gras culture into the Southwest. Other Markets: A few other cities contributed to nationwide consumption. Boston had some fine French restaurants and upscale New American spots with foie gras (though Boston’s more traditional dining meant slightly less foie gras than NYC/DC). Philadelphia similarly had a handful of prominent foie gras dishes (and an attempt to ban it around 2012 which failed, indicating it was on the radar). New Orleans – given its French culinary heritage – saw foie gras at a few top restaurants (e.g. Commander’s Palace occasionally, and John Besh’s restaurants pre-2017). And pockets of the Midwest and West – e.g. Minneapolis/St. Paul (where Au Bon Canard foie gras from MN was served at local restaurants), Denver and Seattle (each with a small cadre of high-end restaurants using it) – added to the mosaic. These were all relatively minor in volume. Relative Ranking of Markets (2010–2017): Taking into account number of restaurants and volume consumed, a rough hierarchy is: New York City – by far the largest foie gras market (hundreds of establishments, ~30% of U.S. consumption). Las Vegas – second, due to its density of fine dining (dozens of top restaurants featuring foie gras). Chicago – third, a major culinary city with many foie gras offerings post-ban repeal. Los Angeles – would be a contender for #2 or #3 if not for the ban; during legal windows, LA had strong demand. San Francisco Bay Area – similar to LA; significant when legal (especially Napa/Sonoma destinations). Washington, D.C. – a solid market with many upscale restaurants (smaller than the above, but noteworthy). Miami/South Florida – a regional luxury market (fewer restaurants, but high-end clientele). Houston/Dallas (Texas) – moderate presence in fine dining and steakhouses; collectively a secondary market. Others (Boston, Philly, New Orleans, etc.) – small but culturally important pockets. It’s important to note that foie gras was largely confined to fine dining. Across these markets, the venues serving foie gras were almost exclusively high-end: Michelin-starred restaurants, luxury hotel dining rooms, celebrated chef-owned restaurants, and expensive steakhouses or tasting menu venues. It was rare to find foie gras in casual or mid-tier restaurants. This concentration in elite dining meant the geographic distribution mapped onto cities known for expense-account restaurants and affluent diners. In summary, New York reigned supreme (a fact openly acknowledged by the farms, who said losing NYC would essentially “shut down” their business), with Vegas and Chicago following. The California market was strong when not legally suppressed, and other large metros maintained a steady if smaller presence. These cities formed the backbone of demand that sustained the U.S. foie gras industry during its peak years.

Hudson Valley Foie Gras (HVFG) and La Belle Farm were the twin pillars of U.S. foie gras production, and understanding their internal operations reveals how they sustained their dominance. Between 2010 and 2017, both farms had evolved into highly efficient, albeit controversial, facilities. Here’s a look inside each, covering their workforce, production workflows, organization, and risk management: Workforce Composition & Labor Conditions: Foie gras production is labor-intensive, and much of the work at both farms was done by immigrant laborers. HVFG’s co-founder Izzy Yanay often highlighted that the farm provided jobs and opportunities to immigrants – indeed, one of La Belle’s owners, Sergio Saravia, originally came to the U.S. as a child because HVFG sponsored his family’s asylum paperwork decades ago. By the 2010s, many workers were from Latin America (El Salvador, Mexico, Guatemala, etc.) or other immigrant communities. Both farms together employed roughly 400 people in total (HVFG around 200–250, La Belle around 150, according to reports). The labor was year-round, as ducks are raised and slaughtered continuously in batches. Conditions on the farm floor were tough: workers performed repetitive tasks like herding and handling ducks, inserting feeding tubes, and slaughtering/eviscerating birds on the line. Animal advocacy investigations revealed some harsh aspects – for example, a PETA undercover report from around 2013 described how at HVFG, the feeders’ jobs were so taxing that the farm gave bonus pay if a worker “accidentally” killed fewer than 50 ducks per month during gavage (ducks sometimes die from ruptured organs or stress in the force-feeding process)[3]. This suggests high turnover and physically demanding labor. However, farm management claimed to incentivize care: at La Belle, feeders (many of whom were women, believed to be gentler with the ducks) got bonuses for producing higher grades of foie gras with minimal bruising. Workers typically lived in the rural communities near the farms, and while wages were relatively low, these jobs were a lifeline in an otherwise economically depressed area. Labor conditions improvements over earlier decades included more training and some mechanization (La Belle introduced a machine-assisted feeding system to reduce strain). Still, by conventional measures, these were factory farm jobs – messy, monotonous, and sometimes dangerous (exposure to animal waste, heavy lifting, etc.). Importantly, no labor unions were present; the farms operated in an agricultural labor context with minimal organized oversight. Production Workflow: The process from duckling to foie gras at these farms was refined through experience and some trial-and-error: Duckling Rearing: Both farms started with day-old Moulard ducklings (male only – female ducklings were considered byproducts since their livers don’t grow as large; La Belle would ship female ducklings to a farm in Trinidad for meat rearing[4], while HVFG likely euthanized or sold females elsewhere). Ducklings were brooded and raised in large barns or open pens for about 12 weeks with normal feeding. They had space to move and access to water for preening (though not open ponds, to avoid disease). Housing: By this era, individual cages had been eliminated (previously some foie gras farms used tiny cages). Instead, HVFG and La Belle kept ducks in group pens on barn floors, with bedding like sawdust. For example, a journalist touring La Belle in 2010 described “an enormous shed, full of birds free to roam… over a sawdust-strewn floor” for the first 12 weeks. Ducks could walk, stretch wings, and engage in limited natural behaviors, albeit indoors. Pre-Gavage Health Checks: Farm staff monitored ducks for health before starting gavage. Only healthy, suitably sized ducks would be selected for force-feeding. (Mortality in the rearing phase was low; La Belle claimed only ~1% mortality pre-gavage, which they noted was “five times lower than on ordinary chicken farms” – a statistic they used to suggest good care.) Gavage (Force-Feeding) Phase: Around 12 weeks of age, ducks were moved to special gavage barns for their final 2–3 weeks. Here, they were penned in small groups (e.g. ~10 ducks per pen at La Belle) in compact pens about 5ft by 7ft each. Each duck was force-fed 2–3 times a day on a schedule. Workers (feeders) would enter the pen, pick up each duck or hold it between their legs, and insert a feeding tube down its throat to deliver a measured amount of corn mash. Both farms had shifted to softer, flexible tubes (La Belle had a custom flexible plastic tube system by the 2010s) rather than rigid metal pipes. The feeding was mechanized in that a pneumatic or electric feeding machine pumped the corn-soy mix in seconds. A key innovation: La Belle’s feeders would palpate the duck’s throat before feeding – if food from the last meal hadn’t cleared, they’d skip that feeding for that duck[5]. This aimed to avoid overfeeding beyond the duck’s capacity, theoretically giving the animal’s body some control. The gavage period lasted about 2 to 3 weeks (typically ~15–18 days) until the ducks’ livers had swollen to 6–10 times normal size (often 1–2 pounds per liver). It was an extremely delicate period: the farms closely tracked each flock’s health, as 2–5% of ducks can die during gavage even under careful management. Both HVFG and La Belle instituted practices to reduce stress – e.g. split shifts for feeders. Traditionally one worker fed the same ducks every session (3× day for ~21 days straight), leading to burnout. La Belle discovered ducks actually recognize the feeder’s clothing, not the person, so they had two workers alternate (wearing the same uniform), giving each feeder rest while ducks still felt it was the “same” feeder[6][7]. After this change, La Belle claimed their yield of top-grade livers improved (suggesting more gentle handling)[8]. Slaughter & Processing: At about 100 days old (pre-gavage plus gavage), ducks were slaughtered on-site. Both farms operated USDA-inspected processing plants. The process: ducks were stunned in an electrified water bath, then killed by neck cutting and bled. Machines defeathered the carcasses (industrial pluckers with rubber “fingers”), and workers then eviscerated and butchered them. A USDA inspector was present during all slaughter shifts, checking for health and proper processing. The livers were immediately inspected for quality and sorted by grade. At La Belle, an assembly line of about 500 ducks per day could be processed by the crew. Hygiene: The farms prided themselves on cleanliness – “gleaming stainless steel” in processing rooms, daily disinfection, and workers wearing full sanitary gear. Carcasses were chilled (air-chilled overnight to maintain meat quality), and the next day, breakdown teams would trim and pack cuts: foie gras lobes (graded A, B, etc.), magret breasts vacuum-sealed, legs cooked or vacuum-packed for confit, fat rendered and jarred, and offal like hearts and gizzards sold or used for pet food. Even feathers were collected for down. This integrated butchery meant almost zero waste. Packing & Shipping: Once processed, products from both farms were shipped out daily. They used cold shipping via FedEx or similar to reach distributors/chefs typically within 24 hours. Foie gras is highly perishable, so maintaining a cold chain was critical. Both farms had packaging operations to box liver orders with ice packs. They also coordinated with distributors (like D’Artagnan’s trucks in the NY area or air freight for farther destinations). Organizational Structure:Hudson Valley Foie Gras (HVFG): Founded in 1985 by Michael Ginor and Izzy Yanay, HVFG by 2010 was led by an experienced management team. Ownership: Ginor and Yanay were co-owners (Ginor the public face/chef figure, Yanay the hands-on farm manager). Yanay served as Vice President and general manager, deeply involved in daily operations and advocacy. Marcus Henley was another key executive (operations manager) who often spoke on regulatory issues. HVFG had a fairly flat hierarchy for a farm employing ~200+: they had foremen for each area (feeding crew leader, processing plant supervisor, etc.), but decisions were tightly controlled by the owners. The workforce was segmented: feeders, barn cleaners, butchers, packers, etc., each group often dominated by particular demographics (e.g. many feeders were women per farm claims, many slaughter-line workers were likely men due to physicality). HVFG also integrated a duck hatchery subsidiary (Hudson Valley Duck Farm) for Pekin ducks and possibly to hatch some of their own Moulards. They had spin-off businesses (e.g. selling organic chickens as well), but foie gras remained core. Importantly, HVFG fostered an image as a “family farm” despite its size – employees often were friends or relatives (there are anecdotes of multiple family members working there). La Belle Farm: La Belle was established in 2000, making it a newer entrant that quickly caught up. Its founders were Herman Lee (Hong Kong-born entrepreneur) and his partners Nelson and Hector Saravia (Salvadoran immigrants)[9]. Herman Lee had a background in poultry (ran Bella Poultry, a chicken operation) and applied that knowledge to foie gras. Organizationally, La Belle was smaller, with a familial atmosphere. By the 2010s, Herman Lee was the mentor/technical director, and the next generation (e.g. Sergio Saravia, son/nephew of the Saravia founders) took on the president role. La Belle’s chain of command included farm managers for husbandry and a plant manager (Bob Ambrose, who also led their Bella Bella Gourmet product line). They too portrayed themselves as family-owned and operated – indeed the Saravia family’s story (coming from wartorn El Salvador and building a business) was often highlighted. La Belle’s team, though smaller, was close-knit; for instance, many workers had been with them since the early 2000s, learning skills from Herman Lee. Vertical integration was a point of pride – *“every step... takes place right on site”, Herman Lee noted. The two farms were technically competitors but often collaborated (sometimes even sharing certain distribution or jointly fighting legislation). They also formed a united front through the Artisan Farmers Alliance – an industry group that represented foie gras producers in lobbying and PR. Infrastructure & Investment: In this era, both HVFG and La Belle made capital investments to improve efficiency and address criticisms: Animal Housing & Equipment: By the 2010s, individual cages had been phased out at both farms in favor of group pens (partly due to animal welfare concerns and pending regulations in Europe that outlawed individual cages). HVFG marketed their product as “cage-free duck foie gras”, explicitly saying they provide space for ducks to move, “allowing social interaction, exercise, freedom of movement” – a direct response to cruelty claims. This required building or retrofitting barns with pen enclosures and adding things like better ventilation and automated feeding machines. La Belle, for instance, invested in that custom flexible feeding tube system and automated feed portioning machine around 2010, which was a significant technological upgrade aimed at both efficiency and duck welfare (less injury, faster feeding). Processing Facilities: Each farm maintained a USDA-approved slaughterhouse on-site. HVFG’s plant (originally built in late 1980s, expanded later) and La Belle’s plant (built ~2000) saw upgrades like modern air-chill systems, stainless steel evisceration lines, and wastewater treatment improvements. (It’s noted in records that HVFG had faced some environmental fines in the 2000s for wastewater; by the 2010s they likely invested in better filtration to comply with the Clean Water Act.) Biosecurity & Farm Management: Both farms instituted stricter biosecurity by this time – requiring workers and visitors to wear protective suits, disinfecting barns, and rotating flocks out of barns to clean (La Belle mentions rotating flocks and pressure-washing barns regularly to avoid disease, instead of relying on antibiotics). These practices were partly to ensure healthy birds (which means better foie gras) and partly to rebut arguments that conditions were squalid. Scaling & Output: HVFG reportedly scaled up to ~half a million ducks/year capacity by investing in more barn space and perhaps contracting with local growers for ducklings. La Belle’s output (~182k ducks/year by mid-2010s) was constrained by its farm size (43 acres), but they squeezed efficiency via technology. There was also some coordination: HVFG and La Belle might adjust production if one had an issue (e.g. if disease hit one flock, the other might cover orders). Essentially, the duopoly by 2017 had fine-tuned production to maximize yield while trying to minimize mortalities and defects (they aimed for as many Grade A livers as possible, since those fetched top dollar). Managing Regulatory Risk: Operating under constant threat of bans or legal challenges, both farms were proactive in regulatory and public relations strategy: They monitored legislative developments closely (e.g. proposed city or state bans) and often pre-emptively engaged local officials. For instance, during NYC’s discussions, Izzy Yanay and Marcus Henley repeatedly invited City Council members to tour the farm, hoping to dissuade them. (No council members took the offer, but the invitation itself became part of the farms’ PR – “we have nothing to hide.”) The farms also lawyered up when needed. HVFG and La Belle didn’t hesitate to litigate. They were part of the coalition that sued California over its ban on foie gras sales, on grounds of federal preemption; while that ultimately failed by 2017, they did score a temporary win in 2015 that allowed sales to resume[1]. Likewise, they prepared to sue New York City after the Council’s 2019 ban (and indeed did sue in 2020, which later led to an injunction in 2022). This willingness to engage in lawsuits was a key part of risk management – essentially fighting bans in court rather than accepting them. Insurance & Compliance: The farms likely had insurance for liability and business interruption (though a city ban wasn’t exactly insurable). They ensured compliance with existing laws to avoid giving opponents ammunition – e.g. adhering to USDA slaughter regs, labor laws, and environmental permits. HVFG in particular was wary of any animal cruelty lawsuits; in 2012, when the Animal Legal Defense Fund sued them for false advertising (“humane foie gras”), HVFG settled to avoid a court precedent, simply removing that wording from marketing[10]. Communication with Distributors & High-Volume Accounts: To keep chefs and distributors on their side, the farms engaged in constant outreach and customer service. Marcus Henley (HVFG) or Sonia Strobel (a salesperson at HVFG) might call up star chefs to reassure them when bans were in the news, emphasizing continuity of supply. The farms also worked closely with D’Artagnan – if a ban threatened a huge market like California, they strategized on re-routing product to other markets or storage. For example, during the California ban years, D’Artagnan helped find new customers in Vegas and elsewhere for the displaced volume. Similarly, when California’s ban was lifted in 2015, the farms quickly ramped up shipments to West Coast clients. This tight communication ensured that distributors and big restaurant groups always knew the status of supply and could plan menus accordingly. Both HVFG and La Belle also invested in image-building to manage risk: inviting media for farm tours (as seen with Serious Eats and other publications given full access to La Belle in 2010), participating in panel discussions or debates to present their side, and maintaining an “open door policy” (at least superficially) toward inquiries. In sum, inside these farms one would find a blend of modern agri-industrial practices and small-farm adaptability. On one hand, they were essentially specialized duck factories – with streamlined workflows from hatching to packing, immigrant labor powering the assembly line, and output maximized for profit. On the other hand, they were relatively small businesses run by hands-on owners who knew their workers and animals intimately, and could pivot quickly in response to external pressures. During 2010–2017, this combination allowed HVFG and La Belle to dominate the sector. They continually improved their infrastructure (to boost productivity and answer welfare critiques), nurtured a loyal workforce (though conditions were hard, jobs were stable in areas that needed employment), and stayed vigilant about legal/political challenges. This is how the duopoly navigated its peak years, maintaining internal stability while weathering the storms outside.