Foie Gras Production in China: Industry History, Scale, Trade, Regulation, and Opposition

Time window covered: 1980s – 2026 Current status: China is a major producer and exporter of foie gras. Production expanded rapidly from pilot projects in the 1980s to an estimated 7,000 tonnes of duck and goose liver annually by the mid‑2020s—roughly 30–45 % of global supply12. Goose liver dominates production, but some farms also force‑feed ducks. Industrial facilities use conventional gavage; experimental shifts to “semi‑automatic” feeding and milder feeds are limited34. The industry is expanding, driven by domestic demand and exports. Duck vs goose: Chinese production overwhelmingly relies on Landes geese, a French breed introduced in the 1980s5. A smaller duck‑liver sector exists, but accurate proportions are not published. Production method: Conventional force‑feeding remains the dominant method. Some producers tout innovations like semi‑automatic feeders or corn flakes instead of whole kernels34, but there is no evidence of widespread adoption of alternative non‑gavage techniques.

China has transformed from a marginal player into one of the world’s largest foie gras producers. Counties such as Linqu (Shandong) and Huoqiu (Anhui) raise more than 5 million Landes geese each year and produce over 5,000 tonnes of foie gras67. By 2025, analysts estimated that Chinese production exceeded 7,000 tonnes annually, representing about 30 % of global supply2. Government‑supported industrial clusters, cheap labour and loose animal‑welfare rules have made Chinese foie gras cheaper than European products8. Politically, the industry enjoys strong local support and is framed as a rural‑revitalisation success. There is no national law prohibiting force‑feeding, and county governments actively court foreign buyers910. However, producers are vulnerable to export regulations imposed by Europe and animal‑welfare campaigns. The domestic market absorbs a large share of output, but companies increasingly export fresh and canned foie gras to Japan, the EU, Southeast Asia and the Middle East118. China serves as a low‑cost exporter and a rapidly growing domestic market. French‑style producers see China as a potential new consumer base, while Chinese producers threaten established European suppliers with cheaper products8. The industry’s success depends on maintaining access to export markets and controlling disease outbreaks.

China’s foie gras story began in the early 1980s when European firms and local governments experimented with raising Landes geese, a breed prized in France. In 1987–1988, French entrepreneurs partnered with Linqu County in Shandong to import breeding stock and teach force‑feeding techniques5. Farmers initially raised the geese for meat, but the large livers attracted attention.

In 1991 Linqu County established China’s first foie gras company—a Sino‑foreign joint venture that imported 3,000 Landes geese. In its first year the company produced 50 tonnes of foie gras, all exported to Japan5. In March 1993 the Ministry of Agriculture designated Linqu a national goose‑breeding base, signalling official support for the nascent industry12. Early production remained small, estimated at about 1,000 tonnes per year by the mid‑2000s13.

China’s urbanisation and rising incomes spurred demand for luxury foods. Linqu County adopted a “company + cooperative + base + farmer” model, integrating breeding, feed supply, fattening, slaughter and processing. By the mid‑2010s, the county processed 5 million geese annually and produced over 5,000 tonnes of foie gras, accounting for 70 % of China’s domestic market6. Producers upgraded facilities with semi‑automatic feeding machines equipped with sensors to reduce labour and standardise gavage3. In parallel, Huoqiu County in Anhui Province developed a competing cluster. Entrepreneurs like Zhu Renjun set up vertically integrated companies that breed and process geese. By 2024 Huoqiu had over 140 goose‑farming operations, producing more than 5 million geese, 5,000+ tonnes of foie gras and 22,500 tonnes of goose meat7. The county’s output accounted for about one‑third of China’s production14.

After Xi Jinping’s anti‑corruption campaign curbed extravagant official banquets, producers sought new markets. Local governments invested heavily: the head of Linqu’s leading company Gao Yuanliang spent 210 million yuan on EU‑compliant processing facilities and built a demonstration park10. Shandong’s Chunguan Food installed an export‑compliant slaughter line costing 50 million yuan and targeted markets such as Japan and the EU15. By 2025, exports from Linqu reached over 30 tonnes per month10, generating about 20 million yuan in revenue15. At the same time, domestic consumption grew as more Chinese consumers discovered locally produced foie gras8.

Production is concentrated in Linqu County (Shandong) and Huoqiu County (Anhui). Linqu accounts for about 70 % of domestic foie gras output6, while Huoqiu contributes around one‑third14. Both regions provide warm climates, abundant corn feed and established poultry industries. Smaller clusters exist in Hebei and Jiangxi.

Shandong Chunguan Food Co. – A privately owned company in Linqu that pioneered large‑scale foie gras production. It operates integrated breeding, feeding and processing facilities and sells under the “Sanrougey” brand. Chunguan introduced semi‑automatic feeders and sensors to optimise gavage3. The company exports to Japan, the EU and Southeast Asia and built an export‑compliant slaughter line costing 50 million yuan15. Sanrougey Fowls Company (Shandong) – Claims to be the largest foie gras producer in Asia and exports about three‑quarters of its production to five‑star hotels on the mainland and in Hong Kong13. The company markets both whole lobes and processed pâtés. Anhui Renjun Poultry Farming Co. – Founded by Zhu Renjun in Huoqiu. The company raises 120,000 geese and sells about 110 tonnes of foie gras annually7. Its operations illustrate Huoqiu’s integrated model: farms, hatcheries, feed mills and a processing plant. Producer cooperatives – Both counties promote cooperatives that pool small farms into standardised breeding bases. Linqu has over 650 standardised breeding facilities3, while Huoqiu hosts more than 100 companies engaged in breeding and processing16. These cooperatives supply large processors but maintain some independent ownership.

Typical farms house several thousand geese each and rely on contract farmers for fattening. Industrial facilities process hundreds of birds per day; Shandong’s integrated plants handle 5 million geese annually6. Products include fresh and frozen lobes, canned pâtés, and prepared dishes. Export markets favour fresh foie gras, which commands higher prices and constitutes the majority of exports15. Domestically, goose liver is often sold sliced or as part of high‑end banquet menus.

Historical data are sparse, but early reports suggested China produced around 1,000 tonnes of foie gras per year in the late 2000s13. By 2024–2025, Linqu and Huoqiu alone produced over 10,000 tonnes (about 5,000 tonnes each)67. A Korean media report based on official statistics estimated national production at over 7,000 tonnes and about 30 % of global output2. People’s Daily articles claim China accounts for 45 % of global production16. The discrepancy reflects uncertainty; the likely range is 7,000–10,000 tonnes per year.

China’s foie gras is overwhelmingly from geese, particularly the Landes breed, because geese handle force‑feeding better and yield larger livers. Some farms experiment with ducks, but there are no published volumes. Feed is primarily corn and soymeal; local authorities encourage farmers to grow maize to ensure supply. Producers claim to use corn flakes instead of whole kernels and to play music to geese to reduce stress4, but no independent data verify animal welfare improvements.

Costs are lower than in Europe due to cheap labour, loose regulatory oversight and integrated supply chains. Chinese producers operate in concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) similar to U.S. and European industrial farms. A 2007 environmental study noted that 90 % of Chinese animal farms lacked pollution controls, producing vast quantities of waste and air pollutants and exposing workers to respiratory risks1718. These conditions persist in many goose farms. Major investments such as semi‑automatic feeders reduce labour intensity but increase capital costs3. Compliance with EU sanitary standards (e.g., 3 km separation between farms and residences) increases costs; only about 10 % of Huoqiu enterprises meet export criteria14.

Whole goose livers sell domestically for roughly ¥700–¥900 per kilogram (about $100–$130), far below French imports. Canned products retail for even less. Export prices vary by market: fresh lobes shipped to Japan or the EU command premium prices, while canned 100 g tins exported to the Middle East fetch lower values8. Producers rely on volume rather than high margins and benefit from state subsidies and favourable land leases.

Hard trade data are scarce, but local reports provide glimpses. Linqu’s EU‑standard facilities ship over 30 tonnes of foie gras per month10. In 2025, Chunguan Food generated export revenues of about 20 million yuan (≈US$2.8 million), a 19 % year‑on‑year increase, by supplying fresh foie gras to Japan, the EU and Southeast Asia15. Sanrougey claims that 75 % of its production is exported to five‑star hotels in mainland China and Hong Kong13, suggesting a focus on domestic luxury hospitality rather than overseas markets. Chinese producers also export small cans and pâtés to the Middle East, where 100 g tins are marketed to consumers unfamiliar with fresh foie gras8. There is limited evidence of significant exports to the United States because of animal‑welfare campaigns and state bans. European import data indicate that France, Spain and Belgium remain net exporters to China, not vice versa, implying that Chinese foie gras is still mostly consumed domestically or exported within Asia.

Producers depend on both domestic consumers and a handful of foreign markets. Linqu’s exports represent less than 10 % of its total output, demonstrating that the industry remains primarily domestic. However, Chinese producers hope to expand exports as domestic demand faces headwinds from anti‑corruption measures and economic slowdown8. China imports small volumes of high‑end French foie gras to satisfy luxury consumers. France is lobbying Beijing to ease import restrictions imposed during avian‑influenza outbreaks, hoping to sell into the large Chinese market19.

China has no comprehensive animal‑cruelty statute. A draft law proposed in 2010 stalled, and the Ministry of Agriculture acknowledged in 2019 that enacting legislation would be “long and arduous”9. As a result, force‑feeding is not explicitly regulated; producers operate under general livestock standards. Local governments treat foie gras as a specialty product and offer subsidies, tax breaks and land access.

Foie gras processing is regulated under the Food Safety Law and veterinary inspection rules. To export to the EU, farms must maintain biosecurity measures (e.g., separation distances, wastewater treatment) and undergo audits by customs authorities. Only a minority of Chinese enterprises meet these standards; for example, 90 % of Huoqiu farms cannot export because they are located too close to residences or lack compliant facilities14.

Oversight is fragmented. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs oversees animal disease prevention and slaughterhouse licensing. County administrations handle routine inspections but rarely sanction producers. There are no public records of fines or facility closures for animal‑welfare violations. Environmental enforcement is equally lax; the 2007 study observed that CAFOs create significant pollution and worker health risks1718. Occasional crackdowns target illegal slaughter or counterfeit products rather than force‑feeding.

International animal‑welfare organisations have criticised Chinese foie gras production for extreme force‑feeding and confinement. There are few domestic investigations, and producers maintain strict biosecurity and media controls. Companies claim to improve welfare by using corn flakes instead of kernels and playing soothing music during gavage4; however, there is no independent verification. In 2012, British investor Creek Project Investments planned a massive foie gras farm near Poyang Lake, Jiangxi. Activists warned it would cram 15 million geese into factory farms and cause pollution20. After an international campaign, the company suspended the project and agreed to consult animal‑welfare experts21, illustrating the sensitivity of welfare issues.

China has a history of avian‑influenza outbreaks, though none have been publicly linked to foie gras. The high density of waterfowl increases risk. During the COVID‑19 pandemic, authorities imposed strict quarantine and culling measures. EU buyers remain cautious and require surveillance. There have been no major publicised food‑safety recalls of Chinese foie gras.

CAFO conditions expose workers to respiratory diseases and injuries. The 2007 environmental health research noted that nearly all Chinese animal farms lacked proper waste treatment and emitted air pollutants such as ammonia and hydrogen sulphide1718. Goose farms generate large volumes of manure and effluent that contaminate rivers and lakes; local residents have complained about odours and water pollution. However, official data on worker injuries or regulatory enforcement are not available.

Organised opposition to foie gras production in China is limited but growing. International NGOs such as Compassion in World Farming and Humane Society International partnered with Chinese activists to oppose the Poyang Lake mega‑farm. Their campaign highlighted cruelty and environmental risks; as a result, Creek Project suspended its plans and promised to publish an independent review21. Local groups also petitioned provincial authorities. Social‑media users criticised footage of force‑feeding, but censorship and lack of legal protections limit domestic activism. Advocates sometimes target imports rather than domestic production. Animal‑rights groups in Europe and the United States call for bans on Chinese foie gras, citing the absence of welfare laws and potential disease risk. Conversely, French producers lobby for access to the Chinese market and emphasise “artisanal” practices, while Chinese companies promote their products as affordable luxury. There have been no large‑scale protests or restaurant boycotts within China.

There are no known court cases challenging force‑feeding in China. The absence of animal‑cruelty legislation precludes litigation. At the local level, some residents have protested pollution from goose farms, but lawsuits rarely reach courts. Legislative reform has stalled for years; the 2010 draft animal‑protection law has not been adopted9. In contrast, several U.S. states and EU countries have banned sales of force‑fed foie gras, indirectly affecting Chinese exports. French and EU officials have pressed Beijing to lift import restrictions on European foie gras, emphasising reciprocity and trade fairness19.

China’s foie gras industry borrows the industrial model from France—Landes geese, force‑feeding, integrated farms—but diverges in cost structure, scale and regulation. Similarities include vertical integration and dependence on corn feed. Differences arise from cheap labour, lack of welfare laws, and state involvement. Chinese producers operate massive CAFOs that leverage economies of scale; top firms process millions of geese yearly6. Production is export‑driven only at the margins; the domestic market remains central despite talk of global expansion8. Politically, the industry is protected: local governments view it as rural‑development success and resist regulation. In the absence of a national animal‑welfare law, enforcement occurs mainly through export requirements. Thus, China sits closer to the industrial commodity exporter end of the spectrum, with weak cultural attachment compared to France but increasing domestic consumption.

Export market concentration – Only a few enterprises meet EU standards; if European or Japanese buyers impose stricter welfare requirements or sales bans, Chinese exports could fall. Linqu’s export revenue is modest relative to output10, but producers depend on the credibility of EU‑compliant certification. Public health and disease – High‑density waterfowl farms present a constant risk of avian‑influenza outbreaks. An outbreak could prompt culling and trade restrictions. International buyers may insist on transparency and improved biosecurity. Environmental and worker safety – CAFO waste contributes to water and air pollution, and workers face respiratory hazards17. Environmental campaigns could link foie gras to broader concerns about pollution and public health. Regulation of waste management would increase costs. Legal vacuum – The absence of animal‑protection laws is both a protection and a vulnerability. Should China enact comprehensive welfare legislation, force‑feeding could face legal challenges. International trade partners may use animal welfare as leverage in negotiations. Reputational risk – The Poyang Lake controversy showed that transnational activism can influence investors21. Secret footage or investigative reporting could damage the image of Chinese foie gras, especially as the country seeks to market luxury foods globally.

Chinese producers succeeded by scaling quickly, integrating the supply chain and leveraging low costs. Activists seeking reform should note that the Poyang Lake project was delayed not by domestic law but by international pressure, suggesting that cross‑border coalitions and investor advocacy are effective. Campaigns could target export certifications, urging the EU and Japan to require higher welfare standards. Sales bans in destination markets could reduce exports but would not affect the vast domestic market; however, they can stigmatise the product and deter investment. Narrative framing around public health, pollution and worker safety may resonate in China, where environmental issues are increasingly politicised. Advocates might also encourage chefs and retailers to source alternative products or promote plant‑based pâtés, as happened in Hong Kong and Singapore.

People’s Daily & Xinhua (2024–2025) – Articles on Linqu and Huoqiu counties provide production volumes, historical milestones, state support and export initiatives651231110714. China Daily (Feb 2025) – Profile of Anhui Renjun Poultry Company supplies data on Huoqiu’s production and challenges714. Korean media (Maeil/Chosun/Moneycontrol translations, Dec 2025) – Reports summarising FT and Bloomberg analyses estimate national production at ~7,000 tonnes and highlight competitiveness and export strategies2822. Asia for Animals & Wilson Center – Document opposition to the Poyang Lake mega‑farm and detail environmental and worker risks from CAFOs21201718. Government statement (2019) – Confirms absence of comprehensive animal‑cruelty law9. GlobeNewswire press release (Dec 2025) – Describes cooperation with French foie gras association and Linqu’s integrated industrial model23. 1 3 5 12 County in E China's Shandong produces 20 percent of global foie gras - People's Daily Online https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/0702/c98649-20335176.html 2 “Who Would Have Expected Chinese Products at a Michelin-Starred Restaurant?”—Diners Outraged After Paying Top Dollar - MK https://www.mk.co.kr/en/business/11505712 4 6 A Chinese county's culinary journey -- from foie gras to caviar | Macau Business https://macaubusiness.com/a-chinese-countys-culinary-journey-from-foie-gras-to-caviar/ 7 14 Expanding foie gras market in China and beyond - Chinadaily.com.cn https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202502/21/WS67b7e8daa310c240449d68b1.html 8 China expands premium food exports, challenges global producers - CHOSUNBIZ https://biz.chosun.com/en/en-international/2025/12/27/BHUNGGFXTZHRDESCTS6PAEXBNI/ 9 Ministry sees need to stop animal cruelty https://english.www.gov.cn/statecouncil/ministries/201912/14/content_WS5df4573ac6d0bcf8c4c18d5e.html 10 11 Chinese county becomes global foie gras powerhouse - People's Daily Online https://en.people.cn/n3/2024/0716/c90000-20194311.html 13 Luxury appetites and protectionism bring foie gras production to China https://qz.com/193609/luxury-appetites-and-protectionism-bring-foie-gras-production-to-china 15 County in E China's Shandong produces 20 percent of global foie gras https://cceeccic.org/261156345.html 16 Previously lesser-known specialty agricultural products gain popularity - People's Daily Online https://en.people.cn/n3/2024/0527/c98649-20174509.html 17 18 Microsoft Word - CAFOsFeb28.doc https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/factory_farms_feb28.pdf 19 Wild goose chase? France works to rouse China’s appetite for pricey, imported foie gras | South China Morning Post https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3337676/wild-goose-chase-france-works-rouse-chinas-appetite-pricey-imported-foie-gras 20 21 Suspension of the development of a foie gras operation in Jiangxi province, China https://www.asiaforanimals.com/post/suspension-of-the-development-of-a-foie-gras-operation-in-jiangxi-province-china-2 22 From caviar to cherries: How China is turning luxury foods into a domestic powerhouse https://www.moneycontrol.com/world/from-caviar-to-cherries-how-china-is-turning-luxury-foods-into-a-domestic-powerhouse-article-13739186.html 23 Shandong's Linqu County Elevates Foie Gras Industry to https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/12/17/3206952/0/en/Shandong-s-Linqu-County-Elevates-Foie-Gras-Industry-to-Global-Prominence.html